Cultural Integration of Muslims
in Europe: Prevention of Cultural Misunderstanding and Radicalism. EL-CSID Working Paper Issue 2017/5 • July 2017 by Senocak, Naciye Selin
Working paper
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES)
Cultural Integration of Muslims 
in Europe: Prevention of 
Cultural Misunderstanding 
and Radicalism
Issue 2017/5 • July 2017
Naciye Selin Senocak
This work has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation 
programme under grant agreement No 693799 as part of the “European Leadership in Cultural, Science 
and Innovation Diplomacy” (EL-CSID) project.
The paper reflects only the author’s view, and the Research Executive Agency is not responsible for any 
use that may be made of the information it contains.
Working paper 
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
2
Introduction
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has 
been promoting cultural diplomacy, framed in 
terms of dialogue between civilisations/cultures, 
and has aimed to exploit its role in the conduct 
of foreign policy.  
A recent declaration from the EU’s High Repre-
sentative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
Federica Mogherini, has urged caution, empha-
sising the importance of cultural diplomacy: 
“Investing in cultural diplomacy could help 
strengthening the economy of your region, but 
especially creating bridges, letting others know 
us and knowing others reciprocally, establish-
ing bonds among people especially during these 
hard times, to prevent fears and radicalisation 
both in Europe and abroad. This is why we have 
worked so hard to the first European strategy for 
cultural diplomacy.” 1
We can note that cultural diplomacy is consid-
ered as a means of creating cultural reciprocity 
and preventing radicalisation. Many academic 
reports, research studies and polls present an 
alarming picture about the danger of the growth 
of radicalism in Europe. According to the Euro-
pean Commission Communication published in 
20052, “the majority of the terrorist suspects im-
plicated in those attacks were European citizens, 
born and raised in Member States, who were rad-
icalised and turned against their fellow citizens 
to commit atrocities. The prevention of radicali-
sation is a key part of the fight against terrorism, 
as was highlighted in the European Agenda on 
Security.”3   The terrorist attacks that Europe has 
faced in recent years have not been caused by 
foreign terrorists, but by European terrorists who 
are considered “the enemy within”4. “Those in-
volved are born or bred in Europe and the major-
ity of these individuals appeared to be integrated 
in their Western societies.”5  They speak Europe-
an languages, are Western-educated, and many 
have citizenship of a European country6. 
Recent terrorist attacks in Europe have been 
claimed by Daesh and Al-Qaeda under the pre-
text of jihad in the name of Islam, which has 
marginalised Muslims worldwide7. An automatic 
association of ideas imputes terrorism to Islam. 
Olivier Roy, one of Europe’s distinguished schol-
ars of Islam and extremism, argues: “The world 
is confronted to the Islamisation of radicalism 
instead of the radicalisation of Islam.”8  While 
radicalisation as a whole is still not well under-
stood, it is argued that violent extremism is, at 
root, a social and political phenomenon, rather 
than an intrinsically religious one9. 
The European Council adopted the Declaration 
on Combating Terrorism and created a Europe-
an “Counterterrorism Coordinator” (CTC)10. The 
declaration set out seven strategic objectives. 
Measures identified as falling therein included: 
the identification of factors which contribute to 
recruitment to terrorism; investigating the links 
between extreme religious or political beliefs, 
as well as socio-economic and other factors, 
and support of terrorism; and developing and 
implementing a strategy with which to promote 
cross-cultural and interreligious understanding 
between Europe and the Islamic world11. A signif-
icant step forward in the EU’s counterterrorism 
strategy is that of considering cross-cultural/
interreligious understanding to be a key com-
ponent; it is also important to integrate this ap-
proach in the EU’s cultural diplomacy strategy12. 
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“The 9/11 terrorist attacks drastically changed 
public opinion towards Muslims. Since then, ter-
rorist acts such as the attacks by violent jihad-
ists in London and Madrid, the murder of Dutch 
filmmaker Theo van Gogh, and the massacre at 
the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris have increased 
fear and anxiety. The use of Islam by extremists 
to justify their terrorist acts has made many Eu-
ropeans regard Islam as a threat and fear Mus-
lims as the enemy.”13   Islamic values have been 
the subject of many debates surrounding their 
compatibility with “Western values”. The socio-
political rejection of Muslims has been trans-
formed into Islamophobia. Islamophobia in Eu-
rope manifests itself in irrational hostility, fear, or 
hatred towards Islam, Muslims, and Islamic cul-
ture, as well as active discrimination against the 
groups or individuals therein.14  There is a long 
history in European culture of portraying Mus-
lims as barbaric and intolerant15.  
Pierre Conesa argues that: “The artificial pro-
duction of an imaginary enemy ends up creat-
ing a real enemy”16. The portrayal of Islam and 
Muslims in the media is often detrimental and 
unrepresentative, relying on prejudice17. Nowa-
days, numerous media campaigns are going on 
against Islam and Muslims. Most Western me-
dia with considerable financial resources and 
multiple channels try to show a rough picture of 
Islam to their public.18  
Many reports have highlighted the disadvan-
taged position of Muslim minorities, evidence 
of a rise in manifestations of Islamophobia19, 
and concerns about alienation and radicalisa-
tion, which have triggered a debate in the EU sur-
rounding the need to re-examine cohesion inter-
community and integration measures. Muslim 
immigrants in Europe face discrimination and in-
tolerance due to their religious and cultural iden-
tities. Former Commissioner for Human Rights 
of the Council of Europe Thomas Hammarberg 
has underlined the danger of Islamophobia as 
follow: 
“European countries appear to face another cri-
sis beyond budget deficits – the disintegration 
of human values. One symptom is the increas-
ing expression of intolerance towards Muslims. 
Opinion polls in several European countries re-
flect fear, suspicion and negative opinions of 
Muslims and Islamic culture. These Islamopho-
bic prejudices are combined with racist attitudes 
– directed not least against people originating 
from Turkey, Arab countries and South Asia. 
Muslims with this background are discriminated 
[against] in the labour market and the education 
system in a number of European countries.” 20
The European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance Council of Europe (ECRI)21  has pub-
lished two policy recommendations: General Pol-
icy Recommendation No. 5 on the fight against 
intolerance and discrimination against Muslims 
(CRI (2000) 21) and Policy Recommendation No. 
7 on the national combating of racism and racial 
discrimination (CRI (2003) 8). In addition, Gen-
eral Recommendation No. 8, which combats rac-
ism and terrorism (ECRI (2004) 26), notes: “As 
a result of the fight against Terrorism launched 
since the events of 11 September 2001, some 
Groups, including Arabs, Jews, Muslims, Asylum 
seekers, political refugees and immigrants, cer-
tain minorities and Persons considered to be-
long to such groups, have become particularly 
vulnerable to racism and / or racial discrimina-
tion in many areas of public life, including educa-
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tion, employment, housing, access to Goods and 
services, access to public places and freedom of 
movement.” 22
A deep cultural comprehension of European Mus-
lims is needed to have a better understanding of 
their uneasiness and worries. European Muslims 
are constituted by different ethnic groups, reli-
gious affiliations (Sunni, Shiite, Alevi and Sufis), 
philosophical beliefs, political convictions, sec-
ular trends, languages, and cultural traditions. 
Islam constitutes the second religious group in 
the European society of multiple beliefs23. Many 
Muslim communities in Western Europe have 
their origins in European labour shortages and 
immigration policies of the 1950s and 1960s. 
Varying colonial legacies and historical ties have 
resulted in different European countries attract-
ing certain nationalities24. In the European con-
text, one of the most important issues concerns 
whether Islam is compatible with the European 
value system and whether Muslims are well inte-
grated into European societies or some of them 
suffer from social exclusion and alienation. The 
EU’s cultural identity and values can create so-
cial exclusion and identity crises within Muslim 
minorities in Europe who are culturally perceived 
as the “others”. The social exclusion of Muslims 
in Europe is undeniably linked to the identity cri-
ses which have rendered European Muslims vul-
nerable to Islamist radicalisation and indoctrina-
tion. 
As mentioned in Amnesty International’s report, 
“in the last decade or so some stereotypical 
views on Muslims have been voiced by some po-
litical leaders and have been reflected in public 
opinion polls across Europe”. In this discourse, 
the establishment of Muslim places of worship 
and the wearing of religious and cultural symbols 
and dress are seen to illustrate “unwillingness by 
Muslims to integrate” or an intention to “impose 
values at odds with European identity”25.
From this perspective, in order to figure out the 
cultural misunderstanding, the reasons for radi-
calisation of young European Muslims, and to 
establish a constructive integration approach, 
we will try to answer the following questions 
briefly: Are European values such as freedom, 
democracy and human rights compatible with Is-
lamic values and law? What resources are there 
in Muslim theologies to combat violence in the 
name of religion? How can Muslims integrate in 
European secular democracy? How can culture-
based public diplomacy prevent radicalism and 
integrate Muslim minorities in a participative Eu-
ropean cultural citizenship approach? 
This paper consists of three sections. Rather 
than concentrating on differences, we will try to 
focus on issues of commonality by identifying 
shared values and principles between Islam and 
Western values. The first section outlines defi-
nitions of the basic/core principles of Islamic 
values and figures out the controversial Islamic 
terminology. We decided to study the most con-
troversial Islamic terminology as the source of 
terrorism and ideology of radical Islam against 
Western value system such as the dar al-islam 
and dar al-harb dichotomy, takvir and jihad. We 
based our study on the Quran and objective in-
terpretation of Islamic terminology by the most 
distinguished Muslim scholars. The second sec-
tion introduces ‘briefly’ two distinctive core val-
ues of Islam such as freedom and equality their 
explanation and representation within Quran and 
the Universal Human Rights Declaration. As a 
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theoretical approach the final section explores 
radicalisation reasons of young European Mus-
lims and the modus operandi and best practices 
for cultural integration of the Muslim community 
in the European secular system.
I – The Islamic Axiology and Controversial 
Islamic Terminology
According to Pew’s research, Europeans per-
ceive Islam to be a threat to European culture 
and civilisation26. Ipsos’ poll drew a similar con-
clusion, underlining that Islam is the subject of 
deep rejection in France: “74% of respondents 
believe that Islam is not compatible with repub-
lican values, 8 out of 10 French people think that 
the Muslim religion seeks to impose its mode 
of functioning on others’ and that for 54% of 
respondents, Muslims are fundamentalists.”27 
Muslims in Europe are often considered an un-
integrated minority with different socio-cultural 
values and their belief system is entirely op-
posed to the Western value system.28 
In Europe, the deployment of Islamophobia as 
a primary political campaign has been a major 
strategy of far-right political parties, such as 
the Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands. 
Its leader, Geert Wilders, claims to defend the 
democratic, individual and Universalist values of 
Western Europe against Islam29. “These parties 
have instrumentalized public sentiments of anxi-
ety and disenchantment and have contributed 
to Islam being identified as the ‘most significant 
enemy’ by promoting ideologies of ethnic na-
tionalism and notions of a ‘clash of civilizations’ 
in warning against the ‘Islamization’ of Europe. 
Their political platforms are aimed at halting im-
migration, establishing mandatory integration 
criteria for migrants and reducing the influence 
of Islam.”30  The proponents of Islamophobia 
consider Islam not as a religion but as an ideolo-
gy to which they attribute all of the features of to-
talitarianism and barbarism. The German Islam 
expert, Bassam Tibi emphasises the division in 
terms of Islam and Islamism. He explains Islam 
as a faith, culture, and source of ethics, with Is-
lamism being a mobilising religious ideology, 
represented by a transnational movement that 
not only engages in a new form of irregular war-
fare but also, in other contexts, cynically plays 
and manipulates the game of democracy31.
Furthermore, Islamophobes and fundamental-
ists are relying in particular on a tendentious in-
terpretation of Islamic terminology, such as the 
dar al-islam–dar al-harb dichotomy, sharia, tak-
vir and jihad as the sources of terrorism and ide-
ology of radical Islam against the Western value 
system. A value is a moral preference of a group 
of subjects. Reflection upon values is deemed 
‘axiological’ and is organised around the terms 
‘good’ and ‘bad’32. The tendency to judge others’ 
behaviour based on our own cultural norms is 
the principal reason for cultural misunderstand-
ing and may constitute an obstacle to cultural 
diplomacy. 
“The religion of Islam was established fifteen 
centuries ago, with the revelation of the Qur’an 
to Prophet Muhammad. First and foremost, Is-
lam consists of a faith in God (iman), and is a 
call to cultivate moral excellence (ihsan) in one’s 
attitudes and actions. It is a comprehensive vi-
sion of how to lead a good life, that emphasises 
spiritual and moral values, social obligation to 
others, and individual responsibility.”33  
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The term “Islam”, which in essence means “con-
scious and active adherence to peace”, describes 
a universal religious attitude34. The Quran recog-
nises the existence of different religions, and di-
vinely ordains diversity in all of its forms, be it re-
ligious, ethnic or linguistic. The Islamic doctrine 
of pluralism stems from a logical principle: since 
in Islam only God is Unique and One, all others 
except Him, that is, His creation, are projected 
into multiplicity35.  The Quran thus proposes a vi-
sion of living together based on respect for dif-
ference:
“And if your Lord had willed, He could have made 
mankind one community; but they will not cease 
to differ, except those to whom your Lord has 
mercy. Except whom your Lord has given mer-
cy, and for that He created them.”36 “And of His 
signs are the creation of the heavens and the 
earth and the diversity of your languages and 
your colors. Indeed in that are signs for those 
of knowledge.”37  “We have believed in Allah and 
what has been revealed to us and what has been 
revealed to Abraham and Ishmael and Isaac and 
Jacob and the Descendants and what was given 
to Moses and Jesus and what was given to the 
prophets from their Lord. We make no distinc-
tion between any of them, and we are Muslims 
[in submission] to Him.”38 
Unexpectedly for some, the Quran is the only 
scripture that establishes the universalism of 
revelation and interreligious diversity. Being Mus-
lim implies recognising the authenticity of all of 
the religions revealed before Islam. “Pluralism in 
this sense means that Muslims are required to 
accept the other faiths and beliefs systems and 
their followers as equally respected in our plural-
istic society. In practice, this means that Muslim 
should treat non-Muslim individuals as equal in 
the domain of social interaction, regardless of 
religious or doctrinal disagreements.” 39  
In this context, ‘takfir’ refers to the pronounce-
ment that someone is an unbeliever (kafir) and 
no longer Muslim. Takfir is used in the modern 
era for sanctioning violence against leaders of 
Islamic states who are deemed insufficiently 
religious40. Quranic messages have expressed 
clearly the pacifist attitude, respect towards non-
Muslims, and religious understanding: “Say, ‘O 
disbelievers, I do not worship what you worship. 
Nor are you worshippers of what I worship. Nor 
will I be a worshipper of what you worship. For 
you is your religion, and for me is my religion.’” 41
In Islam, diversity is perceived to be a divine will. 
Respect for diversity is a challenge in today’s 
world. When it is well managed, diversity is a 
wealth, tantamount to a rivalry in goodness. But 
when it is badly managed, it can express itself in 
the will towards power, towards unshared power 
and towards violence in this world, where differ-
ent traditions mingle and live together.
Another Islamic term instrumentalised by radical 
terrorist groups, and which has caused much ink 
to flow in the Western media as the main argu-
ment of Islamophobia, is Jihad. “It is used in ref-
erence to the duty of religious war against unbe-
lievers as a sort of doctrinal crusade.”42  “Jihad in 
its true sense means a positive ethical struggle: 
striving for social justice, fighting against pov-
erty or making efforts to reform oneself. Islam is 
opposed to all forms of terrorism, regardless of 
who sponsors them.”43  
According to a hadith44  interpretation, the Proph-
et Muhammad said: “We have returned from the 
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lesser jihad to the greater jihad” (i.e. the struggle 
against the evil of one's soul)45. The greater jihad 
refers to “the struggle of man against his pas-
sions”. “The fighter in the way of God is the one 
who fights against his ego,” or “the best way to 
practice jihad is to fight against his ego and his 
passions”46. Another hadith interpretation states 
that, the “lesser jihad” concerns only the defen-
sive struggle, that is, when Islam is attacked on 
its territory47. Following these explanations, we 
can deduce that the term ‘jihad’, therefore, does 
not mean war or physical combat. It consists in 
mobilising human energy, be it individual or col-
lective, and tending it towards God, in all aspects 
of life.
“The radical fringe Islamist appropriation of the 
Dar al-Islam/ Dar al-Harb dichotomy as justifica-
tion for their theology of jihad is also cited as 
evidence of the international embrace of Hun-
tington’s thesis.”48  According to Tahir Abbas, 
Dar al-Islam (Land of Islam) ‘Abode of Peace’ 
and Dar al-Harb ‘Abode of War’ both describe a 
metaphysical characteristic between the differ-
ent worlds in which Muslims and non-Muslims 
exist49. “Land of Islam denotes a territory where 
there is freedom to perform public acts of wor-
ship.”50  Dar al-Harb depends on the safety and 
religious freedom of Muslims in that place: if 
Muslims living in a non-Muslim state are not al-
lowed to practice their religion freely and do not 
enjoy safety in a certain territory, then it is de-
scribed as Dar al-Harb51. According to Muslim 
scholar Dr. Wahbeh al-Zuhili, there is no precise 
definition of Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam in the 
existing religious sources of the Quran or the 
Sunnah (the body of Islamic tradition based on 
the Prophet’s actions and sayings)52.   
Contemporary jihadism constitutes a denial of 
the true meaning of jihad. Mohammed Alyahya 
argues that the violent, deviated concept of ji-
hadism is the invention of Wahhabism/Salafism, 
which is deemed responsible for the radicali-
sation of Muslims around the world53. This ab-
scess is certainly born from a Muslim country 
of a postcolonial civilisational malaise, but, with 
globalisation and media coverage, it is now ex-
hibited as a nihilistic ideology under the cover of 
religion. 
II – Islamic Values and Human Rights Prin-
ciples
There was a movement in the Muslim world in 
the 1950s and 1960s to develop Islamic con-
ceptions of human rights. In the 1980s, Muslim 
scholars worked out a statement of an Islamic 
conception of human rights under the Muslim 
Council of Europe. In many respects, these are 
similar to the European Convention on Human 
Rights.54  There is a willingness to reconcile hu-
man rights with Islamic principles and to identify 
Quranic verses that support most articles of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We will 
try to expose briefly some key concepts, such as 
sharia, freedom, equality, and gender equality.   
According to Oxford Islamic Studies, “Sharia 
is God's eternal and immutable will for human-
ity, as expressed in the Quran and Muhammad 
's example (Sunnah), considered binding for all 
believers; ideal Islamic law. The Quran contains 
only about ninety verses directly and specifically 
addressing questions of law. Islamic legal dis-
course refers to these verses as God's law and 
incorporates them into legal codes. The remain-
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der of Islamic law is the result of jurisprudence 
(fiqh), human efforts to codify Islamic norms in 
practical terms and legislate for cases not spe-
cifically dealt with in the Quran and Sunnah”. 
Modern scholars have challenged this claim, 
distinguishing between sharia and fiqh and call-
ing for reform of fiqh codes in light of modern 
conditions”.55 
The recourse to Sharia is often confused with Is-
lamic law, whereas it is simply the codification 
by man of the sacred text, carried out according 
to the interpretations of jurisconsults and the 
schools they claim56. Sharia is, in summary, the 
normative form of the association of the Qur’an 
and the words of the Prophet by religious schol-
ars, according to their specific interpretations 
and not always independent of temporal power. 
Thus, the recurrent controversies in the West, 
and even in Muslim countries, surround certain 
questions according to the imperatives of the 
moment: adultery, wearing the veil, fasting in the 
month of Ramadan, abortion, etc.57  
“In fact, there is a great deal in common between 
human rights declarations and the underlying 
objectives of the Sharia (maqasid al-Sharia), 
which seek to establish dignity, equity and jus-
tice for all. Islam forbids abuses and crimes 
such as forced marriages of men and women, 
domestic violence, female genital mutilation 
and so-called ‘honour killings’, and teaches the 
equality of all human beings regardless of gen-
der. The absence of a common body of Islamic 
laws (fiqh) for the use of all Muslim countries is 
proof that the Sharia is specific to each Muslim 
country that adopts it, according to the legal and 
doctrinal school with which it is connected”.58     
Freedom and equality are the main fundamen-
tal values of the EU that constitute the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights of August 26, 
1789, as a right allowing man to leave the status 
of subject for that of a citizen. According to Ar-
ticle I and Article II: “All human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights. They are en-
dowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brother-
hood. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, na-
tional or social origin, property, birth or other sta-
tus. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on 
the basis of the political, jurisdictional or interna-
tional status of the country or territory to which a 
person belongs, whether it is independent, trust, 
non-self-governing or under any other limitation 
of sovereignty.”59  
Moreover, since belief in a single God is a recur-
ring term in the Quran, it is always matched with 
the notion of freedom to be validated as a choice 
independent of any constraint: “And had your 
Lord willed, those on earth would have believed - 
all of them entirely. Then, [O Muhammad], would 
you compel the people in order that they become 
believers?”60  Importance is given here to free-
dom of choice and, therefore, freedom to believe 
or not to believe. Another verse states: “For you 
is your religion, and for me is my religion.”61
Freedom is a fundamental value in Islam, as it 
determines all of the actions of the Muslims 
upon which they will have to report on the Day 
of Judgment, except for those carried out under 
duress62. According to the Quran, in Islamic be-
lief, a human being is therefore completely free 
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in the choice of his beliefs insofar as he does 
not try to impose his own on others. He is free in 
expressing his opinion and in disseminating his 
ideas on the condition that they do not encour-
age subversion or civic disobedience63. We can 
be very sceptical about such affirmations when 
we know the difficulty of freedom of expression 
in most Muslim countries and the restrictions 
imposed on citizens, including in the practice of 
worship64. 
Equality is presented as one of the fundamental 
values of the Quran. The Quran speaks of “equal-
ity between people” or “among humans”65. In 
Islam, equality is called ‘equity-justice’, and this 
term is often used in Qur’anic verses to recall the 
ethics contained in this important value in the 
sense that it goes far beyond the existing rules 
of law established by man, even if they conform 
to Quranic prescriptions66. Cambridge University 
Islamic Studies report highlights the importance 
of gender equality in Islam, “Equity in an Islamic 
context means justice and overall equality in the 
total rights and responsibilities of both genders. 
Islam teaches the equal treatment of all human 
beings, regardless of gender. Differences be-
tween genders in particular societies relate to 
culture and tradition, prescribing different social 
roles. Muslims have often argued that early Is-
lam was a progressive force that improved the 
rights of women”67.  In the Quran, men and wom-
en equality is expressed as follow: “Their Lord 
responded to them: ‘I never fail to reward any 
worker among you for any work you do, be you 
male or female - you are equal to one another.’”68 
Nevertheless, some scholars note the contrac-
tion of Islamic values and Western values, Bog-
dani argues that: “Some Islamic values and 
norms contradict modern and Western values, 
such as human rights and freedoms, the role of 
women ... ideas about the relations of religion 
and the state, moral codes of everyday behav-
iour and the boundaries of religious and moral 
tolerance.” 69 
As a response to these arguments, some Mus-
lim scholars defends a different approach, “The 
Emphasis placed on women and gender issues 
in current discourse about Islam and Muslims is 
largely driven by the widespread perception that 
Islam is characteristically or even uniquely mi-
sogynist and patriarchal. Such views are rooted, 
to a large extent, in the ideological biases, his-
torical prejudices, and cultural intolerance as-
sociated with “orientalist” approaches to Islam 
which have undoubtedly compromised Western 
ideals of “scientific objectivity”70. 
Indeed, we can note that in textual sources of the 
Quran and spiritual messages of Islam, women 
are equal to men, but all human interpretations 
which have accumulated in religious production 
have distorted the true meaning of Quranic mes-
sages. The sharia and fiqh, which are represent-
ing ethical codes and Islamic laws, are mostly 
based on the interpretation of Quranic messag-
es. Hadiths (the collection of sayings attributed 
to the Prophet Mohammed) and Sunnah (the 
Prophetic model of behaviour) are specific to 
each Muslim country that adopt them, according 
to the legal and doctrinal school with which it is 
connected. “The diverse manner in which these 
countries apply Sharia to daily life highlights how 
Sharia is neither static nor rigid but instead a re-
flection on how different communities interpret 
it.”71  
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Now we are brought back to this paradox in Mus-
lim countries in which we constantly observe 
that a contradiction exists between the values of 
Islam and the use that is made of it, be it at the 
level of exegesis or the deliberate denaturing of 
the Quranic message for political or other pur-
poses.
In the absence of clergy in Sunni Islam, it is up 
to the wisest of Muslims and the most capable 
thereof to explain Islam. This sometimes cre-
ates a very important gap in the interpretation of 
Quranic verses within the supporters of an ob-
scure and retrograde literal Islam, as represent-
ed today by fundamentalists. 
Quranic verses are understood and lived differ-
ently in different parts of the world72. The instru-
mentalisation of the Quran and the tradition of 
the Prophet Mohammad by radical terrorist or-
ganisations urge the need to contextualise Islam 
and transmit its true values and messages to 
Muslims and non-Muslims in order to build an 
interreligious dialogue in Europe. Even so, Brook-
ings Institute report underlines the confusion 
over the word ‘contextualisation’. “This concept 
of ‘contextual’ thinking generated many ques-
tions in and of itself: The purpose here was not 
to ‘reform Islam’ but to think of how the reform 
(in the sense of islah: ‘restore’, ‘renew’) of Mus-
lims’ understanding and practice of Islam may 
play a role in answering some of the challenges 
that they face in the modern world. There are a 
greater number of Western-based Islamic schol-
ars who show a willingness and ability to articu-
late a traditional approach to their religion that is 
merged with a pragmatic understanding of the 
unique milieu of Muslim life in the West.” 73 
As we can note, Western values such as free-
dom, equality, cultural diversity, pluralism and hu-
man rights also constitute the fundament of the 
Islamic value system. This does not mean that 
Muslims living within Western societies share 
identical traditional values to those of Western 
societies.74   Nevertheless, these values can 
constitute the basis for a common approach to 
building a sustainable intercultural and interreli-
gious understanding, and can play a major role 
in integrating Muslim minorities in a European 
secular system through culture-based public di-
plomacy. As stated by Rettman, “We must show 
that interfaces exist between Muslim societies 
and between universal values, which are repre-
sented by the EU, that co-existence and consen-
sus are possible.” 75 
III – Cultural Integration of Muslims in Eu-
rope as an Antidote for Radicalism
The European Commission’s Communication 
on Supporting the Prevention of Radicalisation 
Leading to Violent Extremism mentioned that 
“the main threat comes from an abusive inter-
pretation of Islam exploiting grievances abusing 
religious narratives and symbols providing justi-
fications for acts of violence”76. The communi-
cation notes that a European strategy on violent 
radicalisation would include a focus on employ-
ment, social exclusion and integration issues, 
equal opportunities and non-discrimination, and 
intercultural dialogue, as well as broadcast me-
dia, the Internet, education and youth engage-
ment. The communication goes on to argue that 
the failure to integrate provides “fertile ground 
for violent radicalisation to develop”77. 
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The negative effects of unchallenged Islamopho-
bia include low self-esteem, stress and depres-
sion, anger and frustration, confusion, a sense of 
powerlessness, and the provocation of reaction-
ary attitudes and impulses, which may increase 
vulnerability to radicalisation and extremism78. 
According to Olivier Roy: “Two readings today 
dominate the scene and structure of televised 
debates and newspaper pages: the culturalist 
explanation and the third worldist explanation. 
The first highlights the recurring and enduring 
war of civilisations: the revolt of young Muslims 
demonstrates the extent to which Islam cannot 
be integrated, at least as long as a theological re-
form has not removed from the Quran the appeal 
to Jihad.  The second constantly evokes postco-
lonial suffering, the identification of young peo-
ple with the Palestinian cause, their rejection of 
Western interventions in the Middle East and 
their exclusion from a racist and Islamophobic 
French society; but both explanations run coun-
ter to the same problem.”79 
As we explained in the previous section, the cul-
turalist explanation cannot be justified. Islamic 
values and terminology are instrumentalised 
and distorted by the fundamentalists and, as 
underlined by the European Commission Com-
munication, “the abusive interpretation of Islam 
is creating the radicalization, not Islam as a reli-
gion itself”80.  
Multiple generations of Western Muslims have 
considerably re-evaluated their parents’ under-
standing of Islam and the role it should play in 
one’s life. But this ‘Islam of the parents’ does 
not necessarily speak to the problems faced by 
Muslims in the West today81.
Olivier Roy’s analysis concerning the reasons for 
the disintegration and radicalisation of young 
Muslims who reject all forms of cultural integra-
tion should be carefully studied:
“The ‘second generation’ never adhere to the Is-
lam of their parents who do not represent a tra-
dition that would revolt against Westernisation. 
They are westernised, they speak better French 
than their parents. All shared the ‘young’ culture 
of their generation, they drank alcohol, smoked 
shit, danced the girls in nightclubs. A large pro-
portion of them went to prison. And then one fine 
morning, they (re)converted, choosing Salafist 
Islam, that is Islam rejecting the concept of Cul-
ture, an Islam of the norm that allows them to 
rebuild themselves. They do not want the culture 
of their parents or a ‘Western’ culture which they 
consider as symbol of their self-hatred. The key 
to revolt is first of all the lack of transmission of 
a culturally inserted religion. This is a problem 
that does not concern the ‘first generation’ that 
carries out the cultural Islam of the country of 
origin, but has not been able to transmit it.”82 
According to Maxwell, faith and belief are not the 
dictating influence and element moulding young 
Muslims’ mindsets. Rather, the setback of inte-
gration has led to the problems associated with 
the identity crisis. Therefore, concentrating sole-
ly on the sector of religion is not the best way in 
which to categorise the Muslim population resid-
ing in Europe. The lack of integration has been 
an ongoing issue in France and other nations83. 
The European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA) published an interesting report 
on the experiences of Muslim and non-Muslim 
youth (aged 12-18 years) in France, Spain and 
the UK in relation to experiences of social mar-
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ginalisation and racism and in relation to a sense 
of social isolation and support for and involve-
ment in violence. The result is insightful for the 
comprehension of radicalisation of young Mus-
lims in Europe: 
“In all three EU Member States surveyed, young 
people who felt socially marginalised and those 
who had been a victim of violence because of 
their cultural or religious background, skin colour 
or language, were more likely to use emotional 
violence (such as teasing or bullying) towards 
others than young people who did not feel so-
cially marginalised or those who had not been 
victimised for the above-mentioned reasons. 
Muslim youths have greater levels of concern 
about tolerance towards cultural identities, both 
at a personal and a global level, which is likely 
to impact on their understanding of the way in 
which such issues are dealt with politically. With 
this in mind, the results indicated that young 
Muslims appeared to feel more powerless to 
participate in legitimate forms of protest or ac-
tive citizenship than young non-Muslims. (…) 
Acts of injustice or exclusion towards Muslim 
youths, in particular, may cause alienation from 
wider society. This may lead some young people 
to develop sympathy or support for the use of 
violence.”84 
Theoretical and empirical literature is divided be-
tween theories of cultural integration, suggesting 
that migrants gradually absorb the values and 
lifestyles of their countries of destination, and 
theories of multiculturalism, which suggest that 
enduring traditions, shared identities, and deep 
rooted values have persisted for many minority 
groups for many decades, or even for centuries. 
Furthermore, migrants should be engaged in the 
rights and responsibilities of democratic citizen-
ship in their host societies, even though they 
should be free to maintain distinct cultural iden-
tities, practices and beliefs85.
The cultural integration process in Europe under 
the banner of secular extremism86  has created 
social exclusion and marginalisation of Muslims 
in Europe, which is undeniably linked to the iden-
tity crises which have rendered European Mus-
lims vulnerable to Islamist radicalisation and 
indoctrination. Marranci has also argued this 
problematic:
However, Muslim immigrants have to deal with a 
schizophrenic language and political behaviour. 
On the one hand, Europe asks them to become 
part of it, in other words to become, if not ‘fully’ 
Europeans, at least Muslims of Europe; in other 
words, Muslims that re-elaborate their cultural 
and religious identity to become citizens of a 
new Europe, which include also Islam. But, at 
the same time, Europe acts in a way that Mus-
lims can only remain Muslims in Europe; in other 
words, aliens in a Christocentric European envi-
ronment to whom tolerance might be only grant-
ed. It is Islamophobia and, in particular, what 
could be called institutional Islamophobia that 
prevents Muslims to become of Europe87.
The European Commission published in 2004 
the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration, 
in which the integration process is viewed by the 
EU as a two-way process of mutual accommo-
dation: 
“Integration is a dynamic long term and con-
tinuous two-way process of mutual accommo-
dation, not a static outcome. It demands the 
participation not only of immigrants and their 
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descendants but of every resident. The integra-
tion process involves adaptation by immigrants, 
both men and women, who all have rights and 
responsibilities in relation to their new country 
of residence. It also involves the receiving soci-
ety, which should create opportunities for the im-
migrants ’full economic, social, cultural and po-
litical participation. Accordingly, Member States 
are encouraged to consider and involve both 
immigrants and national citizens in integration 
policy, and to communicate clearly their mutual 
rights and responsibilities.”88
Nevertheless, the two-way process of mutual 
accommodation is criticised as being a hid-
den one-way process. Hansen notes: “Once the 
question of ‘principles and values’ enters into 
the picture, the already mistaken ‘two-way pro-
cess’ quickly yields to an even more disquieting 
one-way process where integration, in essence, 
becomes synonymous with an exclusive duty to 
adapt on part of the migrant society. This pro-
ceeds from the Commission’s appropriation of 
the ‘respect for human rights and human dignity’ 
as being constitutive of ‘our’ particular values.”89 
The biculturalism of European citizens of for-
eign origin should be a valuable asset in these 
times of globalisation. Instead of celebrating 
the cultural and economic potential of immigra-
tion, welcoming the demographic acceleration is 
likely to bring an ageing continent, rejoicing in its 
contribution to the balance of social accounts. 
Rather than receiving gratitude, it prefers to feed 
frustration, their anger or that of their offspring 
in disregard of its well-understood interests90.
The Eurobarometer Survey published in 2009 
showed that religion-based discrimination is an 
important challenge for EU member states: “Dis-
crimination based on religion/belief is seen as 
most widespread of all in the Netherlands (59%) 
and France (58%), followed by Denmark (55%), 
Belgium (54%), Sweden (53%) and Greece (51%). 
We note that these are all countries where immi-
gration issues feature prominently in the public 
debate. At the other end of the scale, just 12% 
of Czechs and Slovakians, 13% of Latvians and 
14% of Lithuanians think this type of discrimina-
tion is common in their country. These are all 
countries where there is relatively little religious 
diversity.” 91
EUMC Report emphasises the willingness of 
democratic and civic engagement of European 
Muslims confronted to some reluctance: “Many 
Muslims acknowledge that they themselves also 
need to do more to engage with wider society 
in order to overcome the obstacles and difficul-
ties that they face and to take greater responsi-
bility for integration. However, engagement and 
participation need encouragement and support 
from mainstream society, which needs to do 
more to accommodate diversity and remove bar-
riers to integration”92. 
As argued by Franz, “Radicalization has been 
meditated upon the problem of lack of integra-
tion within the public community. Young individu-
als who do not feel incorporated within the com-
munity have lost their sense of belonging and 
have evolved into finding new ways to where one 
best fits, and terrorist organizations find those 
men who recruit those beings who are vulner-
able.”93  Muslims living in isolated urban commu-
nities are becoming alienated from democratic 
societies and may be developing closer sympa-
thies with extremist Islamic movements94. In this 
isolated milieu, Internet seems to be the most 
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powerful and effective process of radicalisation. 
According to Martinez, “With technology advanc-
es, everyone has access to everything on the net. 
An individual can self-radicalize simply through 
reading and admiring leaders of terrorist groups 
or even making contact with recruiters who will 
address them; accordingly, as they see fit”.95  So-
cial networking sites and Islamic cyber-environ-
ments have exposed Muslims to new influences 
outside traditional spheres of knowledge and 
authority. 96
There is clear evidence that, contrary to popular 
belief, the people who are attracted to violent ex-
tremism are likely to be those who do not have 
a good grounding in the religion, and that very 
religious Muslims are, in fact, most resistant to 
radicalisation97. 
Young Muslims who feel excluded from society 
through marginalisation, prejudice and discrimi-
nation seek to create a new identity through 
radicalisation. In this quest for vengeance and to 
prove their existence, terrorism seems to be for 
them a heroic and easily accessible means.
Many impressionable, young Muslims, whose 
only connection with their religion may be the de-
sire to find some sense of moral certainty and a 
place in the world, are given an identity compass 
linked to a vision of the umma (Muslim commu-
nity) within global Islam. This prompts them to 
see themselves as part of a wider struggle of 
resistance against hegemony, imperialism and 
godless capitalism98. 
“There are many ways in which to respond to op-
pression other than fighting. The struggle against 
injustice can take many forms, such as lobbying, 
demonstrating, writing and argumentation. This 
is part of what it means to be a good citizen; it 
is part of contributing to society. However, many 
young people lack the confidence or the skills to 
protest in these ways or to contribute to the de-
cision-making process, which is an area in which 
more work needs to be done”99.
The United Kingdom has launched a precursor 
educational programme for integrating young 
Muslims into active citizenship involvement: “The 
Islam and Citizenship Education Project” (ICE). 
This has been developed and coordinated by the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families 
and the Department for Communities and Local 
Government100. A government-approved award-
bearing course is available based upon ICE ma-
terials. It has been developed and trialled in 10 
madrasas101  and 10 independent schools in 
England. The ICE is the first government-accred-
ited course available to madrasas in the United 
Kingdom102.  The ICE successfully managed to 
produce 44 lessons particularly geared towards 
the teaching of citizenship in madrasas. They 
are available online and can be downloaded and 
used immediately. They are broadly clustered in 
four areas: the skills of citizenship and Islamic 
enquiry; rights and responsibilities; identity and 
diversity; and democracy and justice. The tem-
plated lessons follow a simple three-part format 
in which pupils discuss essential citizenship and 
Islamic values. All lessons have Qur’anic guid-
ance and most have supportive hadiths, or sto-
ries. These lessons are accompanied by teacher 
guidance notes and frequently asked questions, 
and have been enthusiastically endorsed by a 
wide range of Islamic scholars and organisa-
tions representing most of the major Sunni and 
Shia schools of thought103.
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The Centre of Islamic Studies at the University 
of Cambridge proposes the implementation of 
“holistic education”: 
“Holistic education in its deepest sense is fos-
tered within a family circle centred on vibrant 
conservation, discussion, respect for alterna-
tive views and the open exploration of ideas, as 
well as the transmission of traditional wisdom 
and values. A talking culture within families is 
also an essential aspect of the reclamation of 
a culture of personal care, which can provide 
children with emotional resilience and a sense 
of personal responsibilities. The role of the fam-
ily is absolutely central in implementing a range 
of opportunities for the education of the whole 
child. The family is the very foundation of a truly 
holistic education.” 104 
According to this proposition, the implication of 
family and parents seems to be essential. For 
success, parents should be trained and accom-
panied pedagogically for transmitting the right 
values to their children. As highlighted in many 
surveys and reports mentioned above, the dis-
crimination of young Muslims leads them to-
wards extremism. Citizenship and holistic edu-
cation should not only concern young Muslims 
but also non-Muslims, as it is the lack of knowl-
edge of a culture and the prejudices that lead to 
discrimination, isolation and conflicts. The Euro-
pean Union should focus on the best practices of 
the United Kingdom and empower each member 
state to implement courses on cultural diversi-
ty, tolerance and cross-cultural communication 
within secondary and high schools. Involving 
young Muslims in the aid of development pro-
jects, which constitute one of the most impact-
ful tools for cultural interaction, understanding 
and cultural diplomacy, can promote cultural ex-
changes and civic engagement by empowering 
them.
Conclusion
“There is not a single aspect of European civili-
sation in which the decisive influence of Islamic 
culture is not traceable, and nowhere is this so 
clear and momentous as in the genesis of that 
power which constitutes the paramount, distinc-
tive force of the modern world — natural science 
and the scientific spirit”105.  
Western democratic societies are characterised 
by the existence of several axiological systems 
(systems of values) therein, which provokes ten-
sion insofar as the different conceptions of the 
Good, that is, the good life adopted by a commu-
nity, may conflict with other conceptions. Thus, 
the diversity of cultures seems, at first sight, to 
be a factor of social conflict for some and for an-
other an invaluable wealth with which to broaden 
knowledge and understand humanity. Cultural 
diversity is also a major asset for creating inno-
vation in society.
We can observe in the first section that the core 
values of Islam are not different from European 
values. It is an imaginary fracture which is inten-
sified by the speeches of some far-right politi-
cians and the media. “Islamic traditions and 
values are not only compatible with the contem-
porary secular public space, but some of the 
most progressive dynamics of this space were 
in fact integral to the model of community gov-
ernance established by the Prophet Mohammed 
in Medina”106. Nevertheless, as mentioned by 
the European Commission Communication, “the 
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main threat comes from an abusive interpreta-
tion of Islam exploiting grievances abusing reli-
gious narratives and symbols providing justifica-
tions for acts of violence”107. 
The EU can prevent radicalism through the cul-
tural integration of Muslim communities; howev-
er, the implementation of integration policy is the 
responsibility of individual member states, and 
each member state applies its own model of in-
tegration. It is important to recognise the way in 
which increasing anti-Muslim prejudice is a bar-
rier to the development of policies designed to 
achieve public accommodation of Muslim legal 
and ethical norms108.
The absence of a representative body and central 
authority of European Muslim communities is a 
complicating factor in establishing a construc-
tive partnership with the EU, but for community 
integration policies to succeed, multi-agency 
partnerships need to be in place, involving both 
Muslim and non-Muslim groups, that are able 
to address the diverse needs of Muslim com-
munities. Public agencies, NGOs and religious 
organisations should work together to develop, 
promote, implement and follow through with in-
tegration policies and initiatives. In this perspec-
tive, the EU has adopted a resolution on the role 
of intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity and 
education in promoting EU fundamental val-
ues109  but needs to set-up concrete projects with 
its member states.    
The human values to which we are all attached 
are more essential than our divergences and 
what brings us closer together is more impor-
tant than what separates us. This message is 
evidently difficult to make heard in these times 
of passionate debates in which simplifications, 
manipulations and intellectual and media short-
cuts have become widespread. 
Education seems to be the most appropriate 
cultural integration strategy, as stated by Nelson 
Mandela: “education is the most powerful weap-
on you can use to change the world”. 
Footnotes
 1 See EUNews (2016), “Mogherini: Europe is a cultural superpower. 
We need to use its force”, June 1. Available at: http://www.eunews.
it/2016/06/10/mogherini-europe-cultural-superpower-need-use-
force/61145
2 Council of the European Union (2005), “The European Union Coun-
ter-Terrorism Strategy”, November 30. Available at: http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20
REV%204
3  European Commission (2016), “Communication from the Commis-
sion to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Econom-
ic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions: Support-
ing the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism”, 
June 14. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/education_culture/
repository/education/library/publications/2016/communication-
preventing-radicalisation_en.pdf
4  See Peter Chalk and William Rosenau (2004), “Confronting the 
‘Enemy Within’: Security Intelligence, the Police and Counterterror-
ism in Four Democracies”, RAND Corporation. Available at: http://
www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_
MG100.pdf Open Society Foundation (2015), “Islamophobia in Eu-
rope”. Available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ex-
plainers/islamophobia-europe
5  Tomas Precht (2007), “Home grown terrorism and Islamist radi-
calisation in Europe: From conversion to terrorism. Danish Min-




6  Samir Amghar, Amel Boubekeur and Michael Emerson (eds.) (2007), 
“European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society”, Brus-
sels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
7  Gabriel Martinez-Gros (2016), Fascination du djihad, Fureurs Islam-
istes et défaite de la paix, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
8  Quoted in : Jean-François Bayart (2016), Les fondamentalistes de 
l’identité. Laïcisme versus djihadisme, Paris: Karthala, p.10.
9  Sara Savage (2009), “Identity conflict among Muslims in the UK and 
the EU”, Paper presented at the Radicalisation Conference organ-
ised by the Center of Islamic Studies, Cambridge University (June 
11).
Working paper
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
17
10  Council of the European Union (2004), Declaration on Combating 
Terrorism, Brussels, March 24. Available at: http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/DECL-25.3.pdf
11  At Home Europe Project (2009), “Muslim in Europe: A Report on 
11 EU Cities”, New York & Budapest: Open Society Institute. Open 






15 Norman Cigar (1994), “The role of Serbian orientalists in justifica-
tion of genocide against Muslims of the Balkans”, Islamic Quarterly: 
Review of Islamic Culture, 38(3).
16 Pierre Conesa (2011), “La Fabrication de l’ennemi, ou comment tuer 
avec sa conscience pour soi”, Paris: Robert Laffont, p.13.
17 Tomas Precht (2007), “Home grown terrorism and Islamist radi-
calisation in Europe: From conversion to terrorism”, Danish Min-




18 Mirza Mešić (n.d.), “The Perception of Islam and Muslims in the Me-
dia and the Responsibility of European Muslims Towards the Me-
dia”. Available at: http://www.culturelink.org/conf/dialogue/mesic.
pdf
19 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2010), “Experience of 
discrimination, social marginalisation and violence: a comparative 
study of Muslim and non-Muslim youth in three EU Member States”, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office. The report looks at the experienc-
es of Muslim and non-Muslim youth (aged 12-18) in France, Spain 
and the UK in relation to experiences of social marginalisation and 
racism, and in relation to a sense of social isolation and support 
for and involvement in violence. Available at: http://fra.europa.eu/
en/publication/2010/experience-discrimination-social-marginalisa-
tion-and-violence-among-muslim-and-non
20 Thomas Hammarberg quoted in: Amnesty International (2012), 




21 Council of Europe (n.d.), European Commission against Racism 
and Intolerance. Available at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/
ecri/activities/GeneralThemes_en.asp
22 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2006), “Muslims in the 
European Union. Discrimination and Islamophobia”. Available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/49997affd.html
23 Pew Research Center (2017), “Muslim and Islam key findings in the 
U.S. and around the World”, May 26. Available at: http://www.pewre-
search.org/fact-tank/2017/05/26/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-
in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world/
24 Kristin Archick, Paul Belkin, Christopher M. Blanchard et al. (2011), 
“Muslims in Europe: Promoting Integration and Countering Extrem-
ism”, Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 22(4), pp.563-572. 
Available at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33166.pdf
25 Amnesty International (2012), “Choice and Prejudice: Discrimination 
Against Muslims in Europe”. Available at: http://www.amnesty.eu/
content/assets/REPORT.pdf
26 Pew Research Center (2017), “Muslims and Islam: Key findings in 
the U.S. and around the world”, May 26. Available: http://www.pe-
wresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/26/muslims-and-islam-key-find-
ings-in-the-u-s-and-around-the-world
27 Stéphanie Le Bars (2013), “ La religion musulmane fait l’objet 




28 Ashley Kirk and Patrick Scott (2017), “Dutch election: How the far 
Right could win but not rule in a country known for its liberal values”, 




30 Amnesty International (2012), p.15.
31 Bassam Tibi (2012), “Islam and Islamism”, Foreign Affairs. Available 
at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/capsule-review/islam-
ism-and-islam  Paul Barker (2011), “Compatible? Incompatible? A 
Theoretical Analysis of Islam and Democracy”, e-International Rela-
tions, http://www.e-ir.info/2011/06/05/compatible-incompatible-a-
theoretical-analysis-of-islam-and-democracy Bassam Tibi (2009), 
“Islamism and Democracy: On the Compatibility of Institutional Is-
lamism and the Political Culture of Democracy.” Totalitarian Move-
ments and Political Religions Journal, 10(2), pp.135-164. 
32 Ruwen Ogien and Christine Tappolet (2008), Les concepts de 
l’éthique, Faut-il être conséquentialiste?, Paris: Hermann.
33 Abdelwahab A. El-Affendi (2009) (Co-author), Contextualising Islam 
in Britain: exploratory perspectives, HRH Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal 
Center of Islamic Studies, Cambridge University, p.15.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Quran 11 : 118.      Available at: https://quran.com/11/118
37 Quran 30: 22. Available  at: https://quran.com/30/22
38 Quran 2 : 1 36. Available at https://quran.com/2/136
39 El-Affendi, Abdelwahab A. (2009) p.12
40 Oxford Islamic Studies, “Takfir”. Available at: http://www.oxfordis-
lamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2319
41 Quar’an 109 :1-6 Available at: https://quran.com/109/1-
6?translations=20
42 Etymology Dictionnary http://www.etymonline.com/index.
php?term=jihad
Working paper 
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
18
43 El-Affendi, Abdelwahab A. (2009) p.14
44 According to the Oxford Dictionary of Islam, Hadith is defined as 
“Report of the words and deeds of Muhammad and other early Mus-
lims; considered an authoritative source of revelation, second only 
to the Quran (sometimes referred to as sayings of the Prophet).” See 
http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e758
45 Fareed Zakaria (2001), “Why Do They Hate Us?”, Newsweek, October 
15. http://www.peacewithrealism.org/jihad/jihad03.htm
46 “Islam Question and Answer”, https://islamqa.info/en/10455
47 BBC, “Islam: attitudes towards fighting and warfare”, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/rs/war/islamrev2.shtml
48 Beverly Milton-Edwards (2006), Islam and Violence in the Modern 
Era, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p.176.
49 Tahir Abbas (2011), Islamic Radicalism and Multicultural Politics: 
The British Experience, Routledge.
50 Abdelwahab A. El-Affendi (2009) p.35.
51 The Law Library of Congress, Global Legal Research Center (2012), 
“International Relations Under Islamic Law (Shari’a): Dar Al-Harb 
(House of War) vs. Dar Al-Islam (House of Islam)”. Available at: 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/islamic-law/international-relations-
islamic-law.pdf
52 Ibid. See Wahbeh al-Zuhili (2005), “Islam and International Law”, In-
ternational Review of  the Red Cross, 87(858), pp.269, 278. Available 
at: http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_858_zuhili.pdf
53 Mohammed Alyahya (2016), “Don’t Blame ‘Wahhabism’ for Terror-
ism”, New York Times, October 19. Available at: https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/10/20/opinion/dont-blame-wahhabism-for-terror-
ism.html?mcubz=2
54 Abdelwahab A. El-Affendi (2009), p.45.
55 Oxford Islamic Studies, “Sharia”. Available at: http://www.oxfordis-
lamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2168?_hi=1&_pos=1
56 Abdelwahab A. El-Affendi (2009), p.75.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 United Nations (1948), “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, 
December 10. Available at:  http://www.un.org/en/universal-declara-
tion-human-rights/
60 Quran 10 : 99. Available at :  https://quran.com/10/99
61 Quran 10 9: 6 . Available at : https://quran.com/109/6
62 Danial Zainal Abidin (2007), “Islam the misunderstood Religion”, 
Kula Lumpur: PTS Millennia Sdn, p.38.
63 Abdelwahab A. El-Affendi (2009), p.38.
64 Tori Johnson (2012), “Free Speech and Muslim Unrest”, Council on 
Foreign Relations, October 2. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/inter-
view/free-speech-and-muslim-unrest
65 Abdelwahab A. El-Affendi (2009), p.85.
66 Islamic Encyclopaedia, “Equality in Islam’, Center for Islamic Stud-
ies, Presidency of Religious Affairs, Republic of Turkey http://www.
islamansiklopedisi.info/
67 Abdelwahab A. El-Affendi (2009), p 45. See Masjid Tucson (Mosque 
of Tucson), Official Website, “Equality men and women”. Available 
at: http://www.masjidtucson.org/submission/perspectives/wom-
en/equality.html
68 Quran 3:195. Available at: https://quran.com/3/195
69 Mirela Bogdani (2011), “Turkey and the Dilemma of EU Accession”, 
New York: IB Taurus, p.54.
70 Yasir Suleiman (2012), “Contextualisng Islam in Britain II”, Cam-
bridge: University of Cambridge Centre of Islamic Studies, p.47.
71 Southern Poverty Law Center (2017), “Sharia”, Teaching Tolerance 
project. Available at: http://www.tolerance.org/publication/sharia
72 Abdelwahab A. El-Affendi (2009), p.33.
73 Peter Mandaville and Dilwar Hussain (2015), “Contextualizing Islam 
in Europe and North America: Challenges and Opportunities”, Brook-
ings Institution.
74 See Pippa Norris and Ronald F. Inglehart (2012), “Muslim Integration 
into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations”, Political 
Studies, 60(2), pp.228-251. Avaiable at: https://www.hks.harvard.
edu/fs/pnorris/Acrobat/Muslim Integration Into Western Societies.
pdf
75 Andrew Rettman (2010), “Spain champions Turkish membership in 
EU ‘family’”, euobserver.com, January 25. Available at: http://euob-
server.com/9/29331
76 The EU Commission’s Communication on Supporting the Pre-
vention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism, June 24, 





78 Yasir Suleiman (2012), p.47.
79 Olivier Roy (2015), “Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle 
et nihiliste”, Le Monde, November, 24. Available at: http://www.lem-
onde.fr/idees/article/2015/11/24/le-djihadisme-une-revolte-gener-
ationnelle-et-nihiliste_4815992_3232.html#fKpXfGezVGBSFl6t.99
80 The EU Commission’s Communication on Supporting the Pre-
vention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism, June 24, 




81 Peter Mandaville and Dilwar Hussain (2015), “Contextualizing Islam 
in Europe and North America: Challenges and Opportunities”, Brook-
ings Institution.
82 Olivier Roy (2015), “Le djihadisme est une révolte générationnelle 
et nihiliste”, Le Monde, November 24. Available at: http://www.lem-
onde.fr/idees/article/2015/11/24/le-djihadisme-une-revolte-gener-
Working paper
The EL-CSID project is coordinated by the Institute for European Studies (IES) 
19
ationnelle-et-nihiliste_4815992_3232.html#fKpXfGezVGBSFl6t.99
83 Magdalena Martinez (2016), “Loss of Identity, Radicalization, and 
Terrorism”, Master's Thesis. Available at: http://repository.us-
fca.edu/thes/195 - Rahsaan Maxwell and Erik Bleich (2014), “What 
Makes Muslims Feel French?”, Social Forces, 93(1), pp.155-179.
84 EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) (2010), “Experience of 
discrimination, social marginalisation and violence: a comparative 
study of Muslim and non-Muslim youth in three EU Member States”, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office. The report looks at the experienc-
es of Muslim and non-Muslim youth (aged 12-18) in France, Spain 
and the UK in relation to experiences of social marginalisation and 
racism, and in relation to a sense of social isolation and support 
for and involvement in violence. Available at: http://fra.europa.eu/
en/publication/2010/experience-discrimination-social-marginalisa-
tion-and-violence-among-muslim-and-non
85 See Pippa Norris and Ronald F. Inglehart (2012), “Muslim Integration 
into Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations”, Political 
Studies, 60(2), pp.228-251. Will Kymlicka and Bashir Bashir (eds.) 
(2008), “The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies”, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. Robert Holton (2000), “Globaliza-
tion’s Cultural Consequences”, Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Sciences, 570, pp.140-52. For a more extended 
discussion, see also, chapter 1, Pippa Norris and Ronald F. Ingle-
hart (2009), “Cosmopolitan Communication: National Diversity in 
a Global World”, New York: Cambridge University Press. Available 
at: https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4481625/norris_
muslimintegration.pdf?sequence=1
86 Yasir Suleyman (2012), “Contextualising Islam in Britain II”, Cam-
bridge: University of Cambridge Centre of Islamic Studies, p.72.
87 Gabriele Marranci (2004), “Multiculturalism, Islam and the Clash of 
Civilisations Theory: Rethinking Islamophobia”, Culture and Religion, 
5(1).
88 The Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in 
the EU were adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council in No-
vember 2004. Available at http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/
docs/common-basic-principles_en.pdf
89 Peo Hansen (2005), “A Superabundance of Contradictions: The Eu-
ropean Union’s Post-Amsterdam Policies on Migrant ‘Integration’, 
Labour Immigration, Asylum, and Illegal Immigration”, Center for 
Ethic and Urban Studies Occasional Paper.
90 Bayart (2016).
91 European Commission (2009), Special Eurobarometer 317, “Dis-
crimination in the European Union: perceptions, experiences and 
attitudes: discrimination on the basis of religion and belief”, p.99.
92 European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) 
(2006), “Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamo-
phobia” is a report by the on the situation of Muslims in the Member 
States of the European Union. Available at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/
publication/2012/muslims-european-union-discrimination-and-is-
lamophobia (link is external)
93 See Martinez (2016), p.19. Franz, Barbara (2015), “Popjihadism: 
Why Young European Muslims Are Joining The Islamic State”, Medi-
terranean Quarterly, 26(2), pp.5-20.
94 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2009), “Muslim Integration into 
Western Cultures: Between Origins and Destinations”, Harvard Ken-
nedy School (HKS) Faculty Research Working Paper, 7, Harvard 
University. https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/4481625/
norris_muslimintegration.pdf?sequence=1
95 Martinez (2016), p.41.
96 Suleiman (2012), p.36.
97 Ibid, p.95.
98 Ibid, p.93.
99 Abdelwahab A. El-Affendi (2009), p.71.
100 See the Islam and Citizenship Education Project (ICE). Available at: 
http://www.theiceproject.com/index.php
101 Madrasa: Establishment of learning where the Islamic sciences are 
taught; a college for higher studies
102 See the Islam and Citizenship Education Project (ICE). Available at: 
http://www.theiceproject.com/index.php
103 Islam and Citizenship Education (ICE): A project for our times: http://
www.realhistories.org.uk/articles/archive/islam-and-citizenship-
education-ice-a-project-for-our-times.html
104 Suleiman (2012), p.80.
105 Robert Biffalt (1919), “The Making of Humanity”, London: G. Allen 
and Unwin.
106 Suleiman (2012), p.109.
107 See the EU Commission’s Communication on Supporting the Pre-
vention of Radicalisation Leading to Violent Extremism, June 24, 




108 See the European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2016 on 
the role of intercultural dialogue, cultural diversity and education 
in promoting EU fundamental values: http://www.europarl.eu-
ropa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P8-TA-
20160005+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN
109 Nelson Mandela (2013), Lighting your way to a better future, July 
16. Available at:  http://db.nelsonmandela.org/speeches/pub_view.
asp?pg=item&ItemID=NMS909
Working paper 




EL-CSID stands for European Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation Diplomacy. This 
research project analyses the relevance of cultural, science and innovation diplomacy for 
the EU’s external relations. The project has received funding from the European Union’s Ho-
rizon 2020 programme and runs from March 2016 to February 2019.
For more information about the project visit www.el-csid.eu
Associate Prof N. Selin Senocak is Political Scientist, Chair Holder of UNESCO Cultural Diplomacy, Governance 
and Education, Director of Diplomatic and Strategic Studies Center Turkey and Researcher for the European 
Leadership in Cultural, Science and Innovation Diplomacy (EL-CSID) Project. She served as Deputy Dean at Ecole 
Polytechnique de Lausanne - EPFL (Swiss Federal İnstitute of Technology).  She was the Founding Director of Oc-
cidental Studies Applied Research Center at IAU.
She graduated from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Internationales, where she obtained her PhD’s degree on Inter-
national Relations, Strategy and Diplomacy. She studied at Sciences-Po Paris, Université de la Sorbonne and 
CNAM Paris/ParisTech. She is an International Relations expert with a real passion in the Cultural field. She focuses 
her academic career and research studies on cultural diplomacy and implementation of educational system in 
emerging countries.  Senocak, teaches, publishes, and organizes initiatives in the field of cultural diplomacy, west-
ern studies, Turkish foreign policy with a focus on intercultural dialogue between Western and Muslim countries.
